After a contentious mayoral primary, we have our results: incumbent Karen Bass and councilmember Nithya Raman will advance to a general election, leaving Spencer Pratt to plan his next grift. The results show a city fractured by race, age, and most of all class. We previewed the election and laid out a typology of Three Los Angeleses, each an array of communities with distinct and competing interests — and each with one major candidate who best represented it: Conservative LA by the firebrand reality star Spencer Pratt, Liberal LA by the incumbent Mayor Karen Bass, and Left LA by progressive councilmember Nithya Raman. The result is not a monolithically Democratic city but an urban politics that has coalesced, in non-partisan municipal elections, into almost a de facto three-party system.
What happened? To start with, our pre-election model based on polling was fairly accurate: Bass first, with Raman beating Pratt into second. But a lot happened under the hood. The model's primary flaws: polling overestimated support for Miller and Huang and underrated voters' ability to vote tactically, and each candidate did far better in their "home" cluster than demographics and polling alone would predict.
Citywide, the model called the order right but underestimated the front-runners and badly overestimated the minor candidates — voters consolidated tactically toward the viable three.
| Candidate | Actual | Projection weighted to actual electorate | Miss |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bass | 34.3% | 29.4% | +4.9 |
| Raman | 29.0% | 25.8% | +3.2 |
| Pratt | 25.5% | 25.6% | -0.1 |
| Miller | 3.5% | 9.1% | -5.6 |
| Huang | 3.0% | 6.8% | -3.8 |
| Other | 4.7% | 3.1% | +1.6 |
Projection re-weighted to the actual electorate, so misses reflect candidate performance, not turnout error.
The lanes were real
The headline misses were concentrated in two candidates: Miller and Huang, both running far below where polling put them. But those votes did not scatter — they moved down the lanes the model had drawn. Reassign only each minor candidate's unrealized share to the major candidate in their own lane — Huang's to Raman, Miller's to Bass — and the citywide projection lands within a point of every candidate: Bass 35.0 projected against 34.3 actual, Raman 29.7 against 29.0, Pratt 25.6 against 25.5.
The same holds neighborhood by neighborhood. The lane adjustment cuts the average per-cluster miss on the big three from 4.1 points to 2.9, improving nine of the eleven clusters — in Gentrifying Northeast LA the adjusted projection is essentially exact. The two exceptions are findings in their own right: in the Haute Moderates the adjustment makes things worse, because Miller's managerial-moderate voters there broke to Pratt rather than Bass; and in the Progressive Tenants cluster Raman outran even a full absorption of Huang's projected vote.
Bars show each cluster's mean absolute miss on Bass/Raman/Pratt: gray = the projection as published, blue = after moving Huang's unrealized share to Raman and Miller's to Bass. Shorter is better; bars are scaled ×10 for legibility.
Key Lessons
Bass is unpopular — but maintains a strong base
Mayor Karen Bass has taken a lot of flak, and her approval ratings are low; an incumbent mayor taking just 34% of the vote is not a rousing success. However, Bass was able to make the general in a relatively comfortable place by maintaining strength. Bass mostly held her margins among Black voters from the 2022 primary, winning 57% in (Historically) Black LA and 73% in precincts where at least 60% of the electorate was Black.
This gave her a strong base, but even more notably, Bass actually improved her performance among Latino voters across the city compared to the 2022 primary. Bass won the Latino Suburban Populists with 36% of the vote (compared to 30% in 2022) and Si Se Puede with 36% (compared to 26% in 2022). Bass has, mostly unremarked upon by the local English-speaking press, actively improved her standing with LA's largest racial group over the last four years.
Bass's weakness was her collapse among White and Asian voters — younger progressive renters who turned further left to Raman, and more institutional liberal or moderate homeowners, a smaller number of whom broke right to Pratt.
The electorate grew from the bottom
Turnout is the other half of the result. 848,000 Angelenos cast a mayoral vote — 207,000 more than the 2022 primary, lifting turnout from 26.1% to 34.5% of eligible voters. And the growth came disproportionately from the neighborhoods that usually vote least: turnout rates rose by roughly half in Si Se Puede (15.5% to 23.5%) and the Latino Suburban Populists (16.3% to 25.1%), and by 40% in (Historically) Black LA (20.2% to 28.5%), while the Haute Moderates — already voting at triple the rate of Latino LA — barely moved (45.5% to 48.8%).
The turnout gradient that structures every LA election is still steep: the Haute Moderates cast mayoral votes at twice the rate of Si Se Puede. But it compressed, and the electorate that showed up was more Latino and more Black than either 2022 or our projection assumed — the Latino Suburban Populists were 8.0% of the vote against an assumed 6.8%, while the Haute Moderates came in at 6.3% against an assumed 7.1%. That composition shift is part of the mechanics behind Bass beating her projection.
Share of citizen voting-age population casting a vote in the mayoral contest, by cluster: tick = 2022 primary, bar = 2026. Both years use mayoral contest votes over the same census CVAP, so the change is undervote-consistent.
The progressive base is growing in numbers and discipline
One of the most notable phenomena of urban politics over the last decade has been the growth of a self-consciously ideological left-wing voting base in cities across the country. This growth has been primarily among racially diverse young renters, driven by economic precarity. These voters see themselves not just as Democrats, or even as progressive Democrats, but as a distinct political bloc in their own right. One of the authors wrote extensively about this in the context of DC four years ago, and the phenomenon has only grown since, winning mayoral elections in places like New York, Seattle, and DC. These voters powered Raman's second-place finish.
The notable change this year is not just the existence of these voters, powerful enough as a constituency to propel a mayoral candidate of their own for the first time, but also their high discipline and tactical voting. Left-wing voters in this race were split for much of the contest, but moved en masse from Huang to Raman near the election. These voters vote with almost party-like discipline: the only candidates with a higher correlation than the left-wing candidates were GOP-endorsed candidates. This was also one of our major systemic misses in projections, as we followed the polling showing a small but significant base of Huang voters.
| Corr. | Candidate / Measure | Office |
|---|---|---|
| 0.934 | Samuel P. Sukaton | Board of Equalization |
| 0.928 | Henry Mantel | LA City Council CD5 |
| 0.908 | Marissa Roy | City Attorney |
| 0.893 | Eric Strong | Sheriff |
| 0.886 | Eunisses Hernandez | LA City Council CD1 |
| 0.870 | Jane Kim | Insurance Commissioner |
| 0.858 | Oliver Ma | Lieutenant Governor |
| 0.854 | City Charter Measure TC (Yes) | Ballot Measure |
| 0.839 | Faizah Malik | LA City Council CD11 |
| 0.833 | City Charter Measure TT (Yes) | Ballot Measure |
| 0.779 | Tom Steyer | Governor |
| 0.709 | City Charter Measure CB (Yes) | Ballot Measure |
| 0.675 | Kenneth Mejia | Controller |
Pearson correlation of each candidate / measure's 2026 vote share with Raman's mayoral share, computed across LA-city precincts (the native unit for two contests in one election; single-district council races correlate only over their own precincts).
Pratt fails outside the GOP coalition
Much of the narrative before the election was around whether or not Spencer Pratt could win non-Republican voters.
Citywide, Pratt got 25.5%. That is very close to Trump's 2024 citywide 26.6%, and above Trump's 2020 citywide 21.5%. But cluster-by-cluster, the story is more nuanced.
| Cluster | Pratt 2026 | Trump 2024 | vs '24 | Trump 2020 | vs '20 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Multiracial Homeowner Conservatives | 36.6 | 38.0 | -1.4 | 32.5 | +4.1 |
| The Haute Moderates | 47.7 | 37.0 | +10.7 | 31.4 | +16.3 |
| Latino Suburban Populists | 23.9 | 32.1 | -8.2 | 22.3 | +1.6 |
| Playa/Westchester Moderates | 29.8 | 23.4 | +6.4 | 24.0 | +5.8 |
| Westside Liberals | 24.7 | 20.3 | +4.4 | 18.0 | +6.7 |
| (Historically) Black LA | 11.1 | 17.0 | -5.9 | 10.3 | +0.8 |
| Si Se Puede | 16.1 | 25.6 | -9.5 | 15.1 | +1.0 |
| Commie Corridor | 13.2 | 15.1 | -1.9 | 13.5 | -0.3 |
| Multiracial Urban Professionals | 17.1 | 17.7 | -0.6 | 15.0 | +2.1 |
| Multiracial Progressive Tenants | 16.9 | 24.2 | -7.3 | 19.9 | -3.0 |
| Gentrifying Northeast LA | 16.4 | 19.5 | -3.1 | 16.1 | +0.3 |
Trump's share of the presidential vote (votes cast for president) — the same contest-vote basis as Pratt's share of the 2026 mayoral vote — aggregated to the same clusters.
Among affluent homeowner/moderate clusters, Pratt outperformed Trump's 2024 coalition, but in all others, he could only reach the Trump 2020 coalition. His biggest weakness was exactly what we flagged in our projection as his key test: Latino and multiracial working-class areas that swung toward Trump and other populist right-wing measures in 2024 did not carry over to Pratt at the same level. Pratt has some modest crossover appeal among wealthy, tough-on-crime Dems, but clearly underachieves with Latinos compared to Trump 2024. The primary reasons for this are probably the national environment: Trump's approval has collapsed with Latinos, and this election continues a trend of Democratic rebound, alongside the fact that Trump-voting Latinos were always more sporadic and less likely to vote in midterm primaries in the first place.
We described Latino Suburban Populists as the bellwether for whether Pratt could track closer to Caruso/Trump 2024 or fall below 30. He fell to 23.9% there. Si Se Puede was even clearer: Trump 2024 was 25.6%, Pratt was only 16.1%. That is the strongest evidence that 2024 Trump-curious Latino voters did not become a durable MAGA municipal base. Pratt was close to Trump 2024 citywide, but not geographically. He exceeded Trump 2024 among affluent homeowner/moderate clusters, especially Haute Moderates and Playa/Westchester. He fell well below Trump 2024 in Latino and multiracial working-class clusters.
That implies the most durable Pratt vote was not "new multiracial MAGA populism." It was older, whiter, richer, more homeowner-heavy, the municipal anti-left politics that reached their maximum popularity with Nathan Hochman and Rick Caruso.
Pratt's cluster support correlated extremely strongly with Caruso's 2022 primary geography. But he ran far behind Caruso's actual vote shares:
- Multiracial Homeowner Conservatives: Pratt 36.6 vs Caruso primary 48.5
- Haute Moderates: 47.7 vs 55.2
- Latino Suburban Populists: 23.9 vs 39.6
- Playa/Westchester Moderates: 29.7 vs 45.1
- Westside Liberals: 24.6 vs 33.5
Pratt had the shape of Caruso's coalition, but not the breadth. Caruso could win conservative Democrats and moderates at scale; Pratt could not. Pratt's biggest weakness was failure to break in with Latino voters, who voted a plurality for Caruso in the 2022 primary and swung heavily to Trump in 2026. He finished a distant third.
LA voters are less personal and more ideological than ever before
The election demonstrated that voters are, on the whole, more informed, ideological, and tactical in their voting than ever before. Institutional signals (like the LAPPL switching its endorsement from Hydee Feldstein-Soto to John McKinney late in the City Attorney race, or DSA-LA recommending a vote for Nithya Raman over Rae Huang) move hundreds of thousands of votes quickly. That said, there was an elevated rate of Pratt voters undervoting in other municipal elections (Pratt support correlated 0.46 with City Attorney undervote and 0.36 with City Controller undervote). Overall, municipal candidates, particularly progressives and conservatives, had extremely high correlations across the board: voters were aware of the ideological contours of different races and voted accordingly. This holds even in very low-profile contests, like the judicial races, where the left and right voter bases remain clearly legible. Individual candidates assembling heterodox personalist coalitions is more and more rare as voters sort ideologically.
Cluster by cluster
For each neighborhood, the bar shows the actual result; the dark tick marks what the model projected, and the figure to the right is the miss. Where a blue tick appears, it marks the lane-adjusted projection — the published number after moving Huang's unrealized share to Raman and Miller's to Bass, as described above.
Conservative Los Angeles
Multiracial Homeowner Conservatives
We projected Pratt at 37, and he landed at 36.6. Raman was projected at 20 and landed at 20.3. Our only real miss was Bass, who ran about 6 points above projection, mostly because Miller and Huang underperformed.
This cluster was Pratt's largest raw vote source and his clearest mass base. He won 77,289 votes here, more than a third of all his citywide votes. But he did not exceed Trump 2024. Trump got 38.0% here; Pratt got 36.6%. He did beat Trump 2020's 32.5%, but not significantly.
Pratt successfully consolidated a large conservative/homeowner vote, but did not unlock a new level beyond the Trump 2024 ceiling. Compared with Caruso, the gap is much larger: Caruso got 48.5% here in the 2022 primary and 57.5% in the general. Pratt was more polarizing and less acceptable to conservative Democrats and moderate independents.
Bass's 32.6 is also notable. She essentially matched her 2022 primary share here, 32.6. That is a decent defensive result for a mayor who conventional wisdom thought of as brutally unpopular among these voters. This was a cluster where Pratt needed to run up the score to make the runoff — and he dramatically failed to do so.
The Haute Moderates
This was Pratt's biggest overperformance. The model knew he would win, but underestimated the scale. He nearly hit 48%, 10 points above projection in his home cluster.
This is also the cluster where Pratt most clearly outperformed Trump. Trump 2024 was 37.0%; Pratt was 47.7%. Trump 2020 was 31.4%. The wealthy Westside homeowner/moderate bloc did not treat Pratt simply as a Republican. They treated him as the strongest anti-Bass, anti-left, anti-disorder vehicle. This is essentially the only place Pratt broke through in the way he needed to make the general election.
This cluster is rich, white, high-turnout, homeowner-heavy, anti-rent-control, and strongly aligned with Hochman/Caruso millionaire class politics, and Pratt's performance was likely accentuated by his personal story and rage at mismanagement following the Palisades Wildfires.
This was also an area where we expected Adam Miller to be a real strength among ideologically moderate/conservative Democratic voters. The projection gave him 13, and he got 8.6 (still his best cluster). If Miller had any plausible geographic home, it was this cluster. But Pratt, despite his personal style and lack of experience, beat him for the "managerial anti-status-quo moderate" vote.
Latino Suburban Populists
This is perhaps the most interesting and telling cluster, and one we may have done a disservice to by grouping it with Conservative LA in our preview, when it behaves more like a distinct fourth LA.
We identified this cluster as the key test: could Pratt hold the Trump 2024/Caruso-ish Latino suburban populist vote? The answer was no. Pratt got 23.9%, far below Trump 2024's 32.1%, and nowhere near Caruso's 39.6% primary share.
Bass was the major overperformer: projected at 28, actual 36.0. Raman also overperformed, 25.3 vs 21. This cluster did not polarize into Pratt vs the left. It reverted toward Democratic/institutional candidates, with Bass leading and Raman also credible.
That is one of the clearest demographic lessons: Latino Trump 2024 movement did not pass onto Pratt. These voters may have been open to Trump in a presidential context and Caruso in a mayoral context, but Pratt did not inherit the "crime + populism + dissatisfaction" vote, and growing dissatisfaction with Trump's second reign so far tanked Pratt further. In the absence of such populist movement among these voters, Bass' labor and institutional support, including from overlapping councilmembers and sometime-critics Monica Rodriguez and Imelda Padilla, won out.
Playa/Westchester Moderates
This cluster is affluent, highly educated, and homeowner-heavy, but more Democratic than the Haute Moderates. That showed up clearly. Pratt beat Trump 2024 here by about 6 points, but he did not dominate. Bass won with 37.1. Raman got a respectable 24.8.
The big story is Miller's collapse. Projected at 14, actual 3.9. The affluent technocratic moderate lane just did not materialize, and his projected voters instead flowed to Bass as the institutional incumbent, while Raman picked up the small (4%) projected Huang voters. Another area of relative Bass strength: despite her overall collapse among white voters, she was able to win a credible number of partisan moderate Democrats.
Liberal Los Angeles
Westside Liberals
The model got the central story right: this was the Raman/Bass battleground. It also correctly said Raman needed a clear plurality here to have a strong runoff path. She technically won, but only by about 500 votes out of more than 200,000 ballots: 33.2 to 32.9.
Pratt overperformed here, too, 24.7 vs a projection of 21. These voters are mostly high-information liberals, socially liberal, educated, renter-heavy by Westside standards, and historically Bass-friendly. Pratt's 24.7 suggests a real anti-incumbent/moderate backlash even among some affluent Democrats, something we also saw with Haute Moderates. While a significant Pratt breakthrough among these voters never materialized despite many viral anecdotes, he still overperformed his baseline among white homeowners, if no one else.
But Raman's result is probably the single most important result for her runoff path. Before the election, we asked whether she could break into liberal mainstream voters. She did. She did not crush Bass here, but she fought her to a draw in one of the city's largest and highest-turnout clusters. Given that Bass won this region decisively in 2022, Raman's narrow win is a major shift.
Bass, however, did not collapse. She fell from 52.5% in the 2022 primary to 32.9%, a huge drop, but in a three-way race, she remained fully competitive. This region will be among the major battlegrounds in the general election.
(Historically) Black LA
This was Bass's strongest and most important overperformance.
We said Bass needed to be pushing 50 here or she was in trouble. She got 57%. That is below her 2022 primary mark of 61.3, but still a commanding result.
Pratt badly underperformed: projected 16, actual 11.1. He also ran well below Trump 2024's 17.0, though roughly in line with Trump 2020's 10.3. The Trump 2024 increase in Black LA did not translate into Pratt municipal support.
This cluster is the anchor of Bass's first-place finish. She got 50,350 votes here, while Raman got 19,277 and Pratt got 9,811. The raw margin from Black LA alone gave Bass a huge cushion against Raman's Left LA landslides.
Demographically, this is where the Bass correlation with Black CVAP (0.77) is most evident. This correlation is not just racial identity in a narrow sense; it is institutional Democratic loyalty, older political networks, Bass's congressional history, and resistance to both Pratt and a full left insurgency.
Si Se Puede
This is the other huge Latino finding. Bass overperformed, Raman overperformed slightly, Pratt underperformed heavily, and the minor candidates collapsed.
We described Si Se Puede as Latino-labor, low-income, renter-heavy, Sanders/de León/Lee friendly, and less aligned with the gentrified left than with older labor/machine structures. The result strongly confirms that. Bass won by 7.3 points, very close to the "8-10 point lead" we said she would want.
Pratt's 16.1 is especially telling. Trump 2024 got 25.6% here. Pratt got almost 10 points less. Caruso got 29.4% in the 2022 primary and 47.4 in the general. Pratt was not able to convert the rightward presidential swing or the Caruso vote into a durable local base.
Raman's 28.3 is also interesting. She did better than projected and better than her image as a gentrified-left candidate might imply. But she did not beat Bass. This suggests she had enough progressive appeal to grow beyond Commie Corridor-type areas, but not enough institutional connection to win Latino-labor LA. A key test for Raman in the general election will be her ability to expand dramatically with Latino voters.
Left LA
Commie Corridor
This is the cleanest Raman overperformance and the cleanest Huang collapse.
Polling was right that this was Raman-Huang terrain, but wrong about how much Huang would hold. She got 52%, 12 points above projection. Huang got only 4.6%, more than 8 points below the projection.
This is a major strategic finding: the DSA/tenant-left/geographic-left vote did not splinter into a purist socialist protest vote at scale. As the race clarified and the real specter of a Bass vs Pratt general election was raised, it consolidated behind Raman as the viable left candidate.
Raman's 52% is enormous compared with Viola's 17.9 in 2022, but that is not a contradiction. Viola was a protest/left lane candidate in a Bass-Caruso race; Raman was a viable runoff contender with elected-office credibility and a real path. The left vote became strategic.
Pratt and Bass were basically on projection, and the remaining Raman overperformance came from the vanishing Miller voters. The primary story in Commie Corridor was Huang-to-Raman tactical voting.
Multiracial Urban Professionals
Same story as Commie Corridor, but slightly less intense. Raman overperformed by 5.9. Huang collapsed by 7.3. Pratt and Bass were almost exactly where expected, and no Miller vote.
This is a strong validation of the cluster's identity: young, renter-heavy, educated, transient, left-liberal. Raman was the natural candidate once the left consolidated. Huang did not become the vehicle for this electorate, despite the cluster's high rent-control and Mejia/Viola affinity.
The correlation story is very clear here: Raman tracks renters, youth, rent control support, and anti-Prop 36 politics. Urban Professionals gave her 43.9 while holding Pratt to 17.1. This is the renter-youth-professional left in electoral form.
Multiracial Progressive Tenants
This was one of the most accurate top-three projections. Raman, Bass, and Pratt all landed almost exactly where expected. The main difference was Huang and Miller underperforming and "Other" overperforming.
That "Other" number, 9.6, stands out. This cluster may have had more localized, ethnic, protest, or low-information fragmentation than the projection model captured. The many smaller ethnic communities, between Thai Town, Filipinotown, Little Bangladesh, and Koreatown may have voted for minor candidates on ethnic lines or at random.
Huang's 5.9 was her best cluster result, but still far below the projected 12, perhaps reaching some lower-information racially-polarized Asian voters.
Gentrifying Northeast LA
Before the election, we called this "Commie Corridor lite," and the result fits almost perfectly. Raman won big, but not as overwhelmingly as in the Corridor. Pratt was exactly on projection. Bass overperformed by 4.4. Huang collapsed.
This is one of the most interesting Bass/Raman overlap zones. The area is progressive, but more homeowner-inflected and less intensely left than Echo Park/Silver Lake. Raman still won by nearly 10 points, which is impressive. But Bass getting 31.4 shows that the institutional Democratic vote remained significant even in a left-trending geography. Her relative strength with Latino voters kept her competitive in this region.
Compared with past elections, Raman's 41.3 is below Mejia's 59.3 and above Viola's 11.6 by a mile. Again, this means the left geography did not behave like a pure protest vote. It behaved like a strategic progressive electorate.
Looking to November
Bass survived because Black LA and Latino-labor LA held. Raman advanced because the left consolidated behind her and she broke into Westside liberals. Pratt failed because his support was geographically real but too narrow: he matched or exceeded Trump among affluent homeowners, but he failed to inherit Trump 2024's gains among Latino and working-class multiracial voters. The general election will be fought on the ground where the primary was closest — the Westside, and a Latino LA that both finalists now have reason to contest.